Reconstruction and peacebuilding under extreme adversity, The problem of pervasive corruption in Iraq by Looney, Robert
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2008-06
Reconstruction and peacebuilding under
extreme adversity, The problem of
















































10 Reconstruction and peacebuilding 
under extreme adversity
The problem of pervasive 
corruption in Iraq
Robert Looney
Uncontrolled levels of corruption in Iraq are fuelling the country’s sectarian conflict 
and creating a political economy of violence. The political economy of this conflict is 
very much rooted in the alarming levels of corruption that we are dealing with. A lot 
of the money from many sectors of the economy is diverted to sustain the violence.
(Barham Salih, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister)1
There are two major obstacles to Iraq’s economic recovery: the lingering 
violence and ongoing sectarian strife. Combating these problems has been 
further complicated by the large numbers of unemployed, easily available 
weaponry, a quickly widening gap between the rich and poor, and a largely 
impotent government. Pervasive violence and a deteriorating economy 
have created a vicious circle that has further undermined the govern-
ment’s ability to tackle the economy’s four basic problems: the security of 
the oil supply; the high levels of unemployment; deficiencies in infrastruc-
ture; and the government’s failure to introduce much- needed economic 
reforms. In turn, these four problems have contributed to the develop-
ment of a large underground economy reinforced by pervasive corruption 
at all levels of government. With the reduction in violence in recent years 
the underground economy is evolving. However, because the shadow eco-
nomy’s size is largely controlled by the level of corruption, change is 
taking place in composition rather than absolute size.
 In conflict countries, similar types of vicious circles are often set in 
motion through a process whereby negative developments are reinforced 
over time. These cycles will often continue in the same direction until an 
exogenous factor intervenes and stops or reverses the cycle. Research sug-
gests that this is what is happening to the Iraqi economy in the post- 
Saddam period (Looney 2004, 2006a, 2006b). Any efforts to reconstruct 
and restore a functioning Iraqi economy will be constrained by the 
government’s ability to set in motion a virtuous circle of economic expan-
sion and improved security. In turn, this means constructing a strategy 
that positively addresses a number of interrelated factors including: (a) 
the growth and dynamics of the shadow or informal economy; (b) the 














































Reconstruction and corruption in Iraq  165
deterioration in social capital, and in particular the near absence of trust 
between the different regions, religious groups, tribes and even within 
local neighbourhoods; and (c) the evolving relationship between tribes, 
gangs and the insurgency.
 As Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih suggests (in the above 
epigraph), corruption is the common element that ties these diverse 
forces together, and the dynamic that drives the vicious circle of violence 
and economic stagnation that Iraq has experienced. Unfortunately, inter-
national media attention on corruption in Iraq has tended to focus exclu-
sively on high- profile cases of fraud, waste and abuse by US contracting 
authorities and private foreign firms (GAO 2007), or the fallout from the 
Oil- for-Food programme of the 1990s. Without denying the importance of 
these forms of corruption, the analysis that follows is more focused on the 
future, in particular on the rampant and growing domestic Iraqi corrup-
tion that is draining the country’s public finances, choking reconstruction 
efforts and undermining the fragile support for the new Iraqi state (Oxford 
Analytica 2007: 1).
 As the following sections illustrate, the ongoing violence, lack of trust, 
and conflict, together with unique factors such as oil revenues and the 
presence of a serious criminal element, have combined to create an envir-
onment in which the extent and effects of corruption are even more pro-
nounced than that observed by Mark Philp in his chapter (p. 000) in 
‘normal’ post- conflict settings:
In post- conflict societies [corruption’s] impact is potentially still more 
serious, since it can undercut the emergence of stable expectations and 
the processes by which they are legitimated; it can maintain or further 
exacerbate situations in which outcomes lack legitimacy, making it diffi-
cult for any serious form of authority to emerge; it can lead to the 
squandering of aid and external political will; and it can make the weak 
weaker, the poor poorer, and the vulnerable still less secure.
All of this has occurred in Iraq, perhaps even to an unprecedented degree 
– certainly to an extent not envisaged by even the most vocal critics of the 
invasion of Iraq and subsequent reconstruction efforts.
Comparative measures of corruption
Unfortunately there are no definitive measures of corruption.2 Instead 
several indices of the relative ranking of countries are available (Tables 
10.1 and 10.2). In each case, Iraq ranks as one of the world’s most corrupt 
countries. Even worse, there is little evidence that the already pervasive 
corruption that has gripped the country is declining.
 The World Bank’s Governance Indicators (Table 10.1) document Iraq’s 
lack of effective governance not just in the area of corruption control, but 
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in other key areas of governance: voice and accountability, political 
stability/no violence, government effectiveness and the rule of law. The 
country consistently ranks in the bottom 5–10 per cent in each category.
 Since the country’s governance standards are so poor, making connec-
tions between corruption and the slow progress of reconstruction is diffi-
cult. Do reconstruction cost overruns stem from corruption or from 
government incompetence? Does the diversion of reconstruction funds 
stem from corruption or the absence of the rule of law? Do infrastructure 
projects fail to attract follow- on private investment due to corruption or 
the level of violence? Most likely, all these factors are interrelated, thus 
necessitating a comprehensive approach to combating the country’s 
growing levels of corruption.
 Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a 
composite index that draws on multiple expert opinion surveys that poll 
perceptions of public sector corruption. It scores countries on a scale from 
zero to ten, with zero indicating high levels of perceived corruption and 
ten indicating low levels of perceived corruption. Again Iraq (Table 10.2) 
has one of the lowest scores. Unfortunately, rather than improving the 
Table 10.1 Iraq: measures of relative governance, 1996–2009 (in percentiles)
Measures of governance 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002
Voice and accountability 13.7 10.6 9.6 11.1 9.3 4.8 5.3 0.5
Political stability 1.9 1.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9
Government effectiveness 8.1 4.8 1.9 0.5 1.0 1.0 2.4 1.0
Regulatory quality 15.2 12.6 8.3 6.3 5.9 2.9 6.8 0.0
Rule of law 1.4 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.4 2.4
Control of corruption 4.8 2.4 2.4 1.5 3.9 1.9 12.1 1.0
Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2009 (Washington: World Bank, 
2010). Online, available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm.
Table 10.2 Iraq: Corruption Perception Index 2003–2010
Year Score Rank Total countries
2003 2.2 113–117 133
2004 2.1 129–132 145
2005 2.2 137–143 158
2006 1.9 160 163
2007 1.5 178 179
2008 1.3 178 180
2009 1.5 176 180
2010 1.5 175 178
Source: Compiled from Transparency International CPI, various issues. Online, available at: 
www.transparency.org/policy_research.














































Reconstruction and corruption in Iraq  167
situation, as depicted in the World Bank data, it appears to have stabilised 
at very low levels in recent years. As of 2010, Iraq ranked 175 out of 178 
countries.
The pervasive nature of Iraqi corruption
Underlying the figures and indexes are numerous accounts of corruption 
cutting across all segments of Iraqi public and private life (Oxford Analytica 
2007: 1). Following the establishment of the new Iraqi government, in late 
2010, many of the key public ministries expected to play a lead role in the 
country’s reconstruction are staffed largely through political patronage 
(The Economist 2011: 38). Despite efforts over the years, even rudimentary 
systems of accountability, internal controls and the rule of law have been 
lacking. For several years after the invasion, the Interior Ministry epito-
mised this sad state of affairs: with different parts controlled by political 
factions, it housed a myriad of competing police and intelligence agencies 
that pursue various political or sectarian agendas. In the Oil Ministry, cor-
ruption at all levels has led to massive losses of revenue. The Oil Ministry 
is aware of the situation and has endorsed the Extractive Industries Trans-
parency Initiative (EITI) and is seeking to become a full member. In the 
Health Ministry, the dire shortage of medicines and drugs in Iraqi hospi-
tals is largely due to the organised theft that takes place at every point in 
the supply chain. In the Defence Ministry, senior officials are under inves-
tigation following allegations that over US$1 billion worth of military 
equipment was paid for, but not delivered to army units.
 In the justice system, the police and judges in many areas have reverted 
to a system where families can only secure the release of their detained 
relatives on payment of a bribe. It is now routine to hear reports of new 
officers who have just graduated from the police academy selling their 
handguns on the black market. Even worse, many in the police are linked 
to, or are members of, assorted militias and criminal gangs – thus the dis-
tinction between the police, the political militias and criminal groups is 
often marginal in the minds of Iraqis (Oxford Analytica 2010: 1). In the 
southern provinces, insurgent gangs that attacked coalition forces more 
often than not are indistinguishable from gangs of criminals or smugglers, 
loosely affiliated with a Shia militia, mainly concerned with preventing the 
closing down of lucrative smuggling routes.3 With oil products still being 
massively subsidised in Iraq, the smuggling trade is still booming (Looney 
2005e).
 Additional examples of widespread corruption, shoddy work and poor 
management have been documented at length in a series of reports from 
the US Government’s Special Inspector- General for Iraq Reconstruction 
(SIGIR), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which is the inves-
tigative arm of Congress, and CorpWatch, a non- partisan, not- for-profit 
monitoring organisation.
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 In his April 2007 report, Stuart Bowen, the head of SIGIR, noted that 
his agency sampled eight projects and found that seven of them had 
significant operational problems either because the expensive equip-
ment that was purchased was never used or there were other problems 
such as plumbing and electrical failures, lack of proper maintenance and 
looting (SIGIR 2007).4 What was particularly troubling was that this 
report was focused only on projects that the administration had touted 
as successes, In actuality, these successes, should have been described as 
failures.
•	 At	Baghdad	International	Airport,	where	US$11.8	million	were	spent	
on new electrical generators, US$8.6 million worth of the project were 
no longer functioning shortly after completion of the project.
•	 In	 a	 maternity	 hospital	 in	 the	 northern	 city	 of	 Erbil,	 a	 newly	 built	
water purification system did not function; an expensive incinerator 
for medical waste was found padlocked; and medical waste – including 
syringes, used bandages and empty drug vials – was clogging the 
sewage system and probably contaminating the water system.
•	 At	the	same	hospital,	a	newly	installed	system	for	distributing	oxygen	
was ignored by the medical staff, who told inspectors they distrusted 
the sophisticated new equipment and had gone back to using tried- 
and-true oxygen tanks – which were stored unsafely throughout the 
building.
•	 Expensive	generators	went	missing	 from	 the	 Iraqi	Camp	Ur	military	
base, having been hauled off to another post. At the same camp, three 
modular buildings constructed at a cost of US$1.8 million had been 
dismantled and removed with no explanation given.
•	 Barracks	renovated	for	enlisted	soldiers	were	already	in	disrepair,	just	
a year after being handed over to the Iraqi Army.
These events contributed to the widespread concern over the ability of the 
various ministries to manage the reconstruction effort. How much of the 
difficulty can be attributed exclusively to corruption, however, is difficult 
to assess. Because the ministries suffer from shortages of skilled personnel 
and have budgets inadequate to cover maintenance, they have refused to 
assume responsibility for many projects.
 SIGIR concluded that the Iraqi civil service is hampered by inade-
quately trained or unskilled staff. ‘Iraqi government institutions are unde-
veloped and confront significant challenges in staffing a competent, 
non- partisan civil service; effectively fighting corruption; using modern 
technology; and managing resources effectively’ (GAO 2007). Further-
more, political and sectarian loyalties have jeopardised the ministries’ abil-
ities to provide basic services and build credibility among Iraqi citizens. In 
short, government ministries are being staffed with party cronies and their 
budgets are being used as sources of power for political parties.














































Reconstruction and corruption in Iraq  169
 SIGIR in particular noted that patronage in the ministries has led to 
staff instability, as key personnel are replaced when the government 
changes or a new minister is named. An ongoing fear in Iraq is that some 
Iraqi ministries, including the Ministries of Interior, Agriculture, Health, 
Transportation and Tourism, will revert to being led by ministers who are 
aligned with political parties such as the Sadrists who remain hostile to the 
international presence (The Economist 2011: 38). These ministers have used 
their positions to pursue partisan agendas that conflict with the goal of 
building a government that represents all ethnic groups.
 In this environment SIGIR notes that: ‘Corruption jeopardises future 
flows of needed international assistance and reportedly undermines the 
government’s ability to make effective use of current reconstruction assist-
ance.’ Other factors contribute to the corruption problem: an ineffective 
banking system that leaves the government dependent on cash transac-
tions, opaque and obsolete ministry procurement systems, and inade-
quately resourced accountability institutions such as the ministries’ 
Inspector- Generals.
 Aside from the lack of security, corruption is the biggest threat to 
progress in stabilising Iraq. SIGIR reports that Iraq has been losing US$4 
billion to corruption every year since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. 
Paying bribes for services is now standard practice. As noted, corruption is 
particularly endemic in the oil sector, with the Ministry of Oil hit by smug-
gling rackets that have reduced state oil earnings. At least 10 per cent of 
refined fuels are sold on the black market and about 30 per cent of 
imported fuels are smuggled out of Iraq (Glanz and Worth 2006). Hun-
dreds of criminal corruption cases remain open, involving billions of 
dollars. However the situation may improve because Iraq has signed and 
ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and 
is beginning the process of evaluating changes that are required to come 
into compliance.
 In addition, Iraq, at least on paper, has a strong set of institutions 
designed to address corruption issues:
•	 The	Board	of	Supreme	Audit	dates	back	to	the	1920s.
•	 The	 coalition	 installed	 Inspector-	Generals	 in	 all	 Iraqi	ministries	 and	
also created a Commission on Public Integrity to investigate the most 
serious cases of corruption (Coalition Provisional Authority 2004).
•	 Since	April	2003,	a	large	amount	of	international	assistance	has	gone	
into providing these institutions (and the Iraqi courts and police) with 
training, equipment and technical advice.
Nonetheless, these anti- corruption institutions remain very weak and sus-
ceptible to political pressures, and it is common in today’s Iraq to use 
charges of corruption to discredit officials who stand in the way of political 
objectives. The breadth and depth of corruption has infuriated Iraqi 
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citizens, who see politicians and officials growing rich while services 
decline. This also fed disillusionment with the United States, United 
Kingdom and coalition presence, and may have contributed to support for 
militias and insurgents. Corruption also alienates international donors, 
who see much of their investment in Iraq going to waste.
 In order to address this issue, Iraq’s key international partners have sug-
gested a range of schemes that include training investigators, protecting 
judges and witnesses, and reforming procurement and financial processes 
to remove opportunities for fraud. However, without the political will of 
those at the top of the Iraqi government, such technical assistance will be 
of little use. The government’s ability, let alone its determination to crack 
down on corruption, remains very much in doubt.
Corruption as an integral part of the economic dynamics of 
post- war Iraq
While commendable, the attempts at combating corruption in Iraq are 
unlikely to be successful as long as many of the underlying factors remain 
unchanged. As noted above this means addressing three interrelated 
factors: (a) the growth and dynamics of the shadow or informal economy; 
(b) the deterioration in social capital; and (c) the evolving relationship 
between tribes, gangs and the insurgency.
The shadow economy
The only part of the economy to have thrived under Saddam Hussein and 
in the post- 2003 period of instability and insurgency is the country’s infor-
mal economy. In fact, there is ample evidence that the country’s informal 
economy has expanded considerably since Saddam’s overthrow. In this 
regard, Iraq has followed a pattern seen in other parts of the world, where 
informal economies have tended to grow during periods of political, eco-
nomic and social crisis. Preliminary analysis also suggests that a clear 
pattern exists whereby the relative size of a country’s informal economy 
(as a share of gross national product) is related to its progress in opening 
up to the world economy (Looney 2005d, 2007). Countries that are rela-
tively closed tend to have large informal economies, while those countries 
open to the pressures of globalisation have much smaller informal econo-
mies. Furthermore, the informal sector becomes significantly smaller as 
countries increase their control over corruption (Looney 2005d, 2005e).
 As might have been expected, Iraq under Saddam was in a group of 
countries with the highest probability of possessing a large informal 
economy. With limited exposure to the world economy under the sanc-
tions regime, Iraq’s shadow or informal economy probably accounted for 
around 35 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2000 (Looney 
2005b), with nearly 70 per cent of the labour force in employed in 














































Reconstruction and corruption in Iraq  171
informal activities. Since the fall of Saddam, Iraq’s informal economy has 
been fuelled by the ongoing crisis. Clearly, conflict and the insurgency 
have taken a heavy toll on the formal economy. As private firms or public 
enterprises are downsized or closed, newly unemployed workers often find 
that their only choice is to seek work in the informal sector. Also, in 
response to conflict- driven inflation or cutbacks in public services, house-
holds have often needed to supplement formal sector incomes with infor-
mal earnings. In some parts of the country continuing failure in attempts 
to strengthen law and order has made it difficult to contain the expansion 
of criminal activity, some of which continues to plague parts of the shadow 
economy. For example, street vendors are now selling stolen merchandise. 
In sum, corruption has been one of the key factors affecting the size of 
Iraq’s informal or shadow economy (Looney 2005a).5
 Given increased levels of corruption, the insurgency and the uncer-
tainty surrounding political developments, we can expect large segments 
of the population to continue to rely on survival relationships that were 
characteristic of the 1990s sanctions period. This is confirmed daily with 
the news coming out of Iraq describing economic mismanagement 
(Al- Saadi 2004), vast black markets in gasoline (Noozz 2005), increased 
crime and shortages of critical inputs (Murphy 2005). These developments 
do not bode well and suggest that the current size of the informal 
economy is considerably larger than the 35 per cent of GDP during the 
late 1990s. Based on the on- going pervasiveness of corruption (statistically 
the main link to the size of the shadow economy), a safe estimate, in light 
of the decline in the insurgency, would put the informal economy at 
around 50 per cent of gross national product (Looney 2005b, 2005d). It is 
difficult to assess the impact of disbanding of the army and the anti- 
Baathist campaign following Saddam’s overthrow – this estimate may err 
on the conservative side.
 In addition to the factors noted above, the informal economy may be 
growing simply because of the constraints limiting the expansion of formal 
economic activity. Just as private capital formation is often critical to the 
development of a thriving modern economy, social capital creation may 
be just as essential in creating the shift to more formal activities. Iraq’s 
informal or shadow economy presents a number of obstacles to peace-
building. Most notably it facilitates an opaque environment that accom-
modates official corruption. There are solutions, but in the Iraqi context 
they are difficult to implement. Specifically, recent research (Dreher et al. 
2005) suggests that improvements in institutional quality reduces the 
shadow economy directly and corruption both directly and indirectly 
(through its effect on the shadow market). Unfortunately in Iraq’s case, 
the political accommodation of crime- based activities and their associated 
financial gains significantly lessen the incentives for public officials to 
initiate the institutional reforms needed to create a modern transparent 
state (Looney 2005e: 6).
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The deterioration in social capital
Perhaps the most detrimental effect of corruption on the peacebuilding 
process is its effect on the country’s social capital. Social capital refers to 
networks of relationships that bind people together.6 Social capitalists dis-
tinguish such relationships from physical capital and human capital 
(Scanlon 2003). In the context of Iraqi reconstruction and the establish-
ment of a market economy, a key element of social capital centres on a 
particular component of social capital: the notion of trust. Corruption 
reduces trust at all levels thus making it nearly impossible for a formal 
economy to grow and displace the shadow economy.
 Trust is such a critical factor in the development of modern economies 
because it enables contact with others and facilitates the exchange of 
goods and services. It fosters cooperation, and cooperation then breeds 
trust in a two- way interaction necessary for the creation of long- term gen-
eralised norms for cooperation. Social capital thus represents a set of 
resources rooted in networks of relationships possessing the power to facil-
itate economic progress. There are three types of relationships among 
parties to an economic transaction, giving rise to three different types of 
trust (Raiser no date):
 Ascribed trust: This first type of relationship is found among kinship 
groups and family members. These relationships dominate economic 
transactions in subsistence economies and still characterise reproduction 
and the household economy (but also many small- scale crafts and trades).
 Process- based trust: This type of relationship is between individuals that 
have known each other for a long time, but do not share loyalty to a spe-
cific group. Most business networks are characterised by this type of 
repeated relationship and the prevalence of what develops as a process- 
based trust.
 Extended trust: This relationship is between individuals, who enter into a 
transaction with only limited information about the counterpart’s specific 
attributes. For economic exchange to take place between these types of 
individuals, generalised or extended trust is needed. The importance of 
this third type of relationship and the correspondent economic transac-
tions between largely anonymous individuals is a key element of a modern 
economic system.
 This typology suggests that the building of extended trust is a key chal-
lenge for Iraq’s development into a modern economy. It is also important 
to bear in mind the relationships between the various forms of trust. In 
particular, extended trust could not exist without the experience of reci-
procity that is created through repeated interactions among family and 
other members of a societal or business community. Where process- based 
trust is absent, extended trust is unlikely to develop.
 Corruption’s role is to weaken trust at each stage, especially at the 
extended stage and to a somewhat lesser extent at the process stage. The 














































Reconstruction and corruption in Iraq  173
net result is to retard the development of national and even regional 
markets, thus making the attainment of any sort of normal efficiency 
nearly impossible. In Iraq’s case it is unlikely that extended trust in eco-
nomic exchanges could be sustained without third- party enforcement by 
the state. Clearly, trust in government institutions will be a necessary pre-
requisite before Iraq can expect any type of significant expansion of the 
formal economy. This is where the country’s problems lie.
 It is not just the current lack of incentives for policy makers to reform 
the country’s institutions; the situation inherited from the past would have 
made reforms extremely difficult even under more favourable circum-
stances. The Ba’athist government had a profound effect on the nature of 
formal and informal institutions in Iraq. Not only did Ba’athism hamper 
the emergence of a market economy, but it corrupted the judicial and 
legal institutions needed to create and nurture trust. The result was to 
nearly eliminate extended trust, weaken process- based trust, and force 
most transactions into networks that rely almost exclusively on ascribed 
trust. Furthermore, the manner in which Ba’athist Iraq dealt with UN 
sanctions was to abdicate authority over large swathes of public services to 
local groups and militias which undermined many of the state institutions 
that normally help create and maintain trust.7
 In short, Iraqi values today are no longer those that were reported in 
earlier accounts of the pre- Ba’athist period, which stressed the country’s 
vibrant entrepreneurial spirit. People’s values have been affected by years 
of repression under authoritarian top- down decision making. Several 
decades of political and economic insecurity have caused doubt and dis-
trust to be deeply entrenched in the individual mind. They represent a 
major constraint against drawing entrepreneurs and individuals out of the 
safe, kinship- based informal economy.
 One of the main criticisms of US policy in post- war Iraq has been a 
rejection of the very state- centred approaches that were critical to the suc-
cessful reconstruction of post- war Japan and Germany. At the same time, 
fundamental social reforms were also ruled out (Selden 2004). As might 
be expected, with the post- invasion trauma, violence and the slow recovery 
of the state as a social safety net, the process of restoring trust has been 
slow. The economy remains largely divided into segments of mutually 
exclusive networks divided along sectarian/ethnic lines.
Ascribed trust networks
The individual and business networks built on ascribed trust are by far the 
largest in number in Iraq. These are usually confined to the local, infor-
mal economy. Most ascribed trust networks involve groups bound together 
by family, tribal, or ethnic ties, which facilitates business based on verbal 
contracts. Many of these networks have the potential to expand through 
selective interaction with outsiders. However, such expansion will take 
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time in Iraq, especially under the current conditions of public corruption 
and great uncertainty over the enforceability of contracts.
 In today’s Iraq, many ascribed trust activities fall under what is com-
monly referred to as the coping economy – numerous economic interac-
tions during armed conflict that provide benefits to the civilian 
population, particularly the poorest and most vulnerable. These functions 
are even more important to civilian livelihoods where the formal economy 
and traditional livelihoods have been destroyed or rendered difficult to 
sustain. The coping economy includes a wide range of activities including 
subsistence agriculture, petty trade and various household businesses such 
as catering and food processing.
 Of the country’s three main economic sectors – the public sector, the 
oil sector and the coping economy – it is reasonable to assume that a dis-
proportionate share of the country’s poor participate primarily in the 
coping economy. Data released by the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs in 2004 indicates that in the aftermath of the war, about five million 
Iraqis were living below the poverty line, compared with 143,000 in 1993 
(Xinhua News Agency 2004). While the data on poverty is crude and politi-
cally sensitive, a recent estimate from the Ministry of Planning suggests 
that 23 per cent of the population continues to live in poverty. The gov-
ernment’s goal is to reduce this to 16 per cent by 2014 (Ministry of Plan-
ning and Development Cooperation 2009). Significantly, the ministry 
noted that more than one million Iraqi women aged 25 to 40 were unmar-
ried, while divorce cases were increasing, as was child labour. It is reason-
able to assume that this group of women is firmly entrenched in the 
coping economy. The plight of women in Iraq remains grim (UNB 
Connect 2010).
Process- based trust networks
Second, there are the process- based trust networks that rely on existing 
ties between the previous members of the Ba’ath government and crimi-
nal groups that thrived during the sanctions period of the 1990s. Today, 
these activities have largely shifted into the criminal area. The emergence 
of pervasive criminality was readily apparent soon after the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein. If anything, these problems have become increasingly 
severe. According to a UN report: 
The emerging crime problem is subtler and scarier: theft, extortion, 
and drug- and arms- smuggling operations that have become more 
sophisticated, more clandestine, and more organised. In Baghdad, 
one team of thieves recently burned down a warehouse filled with the 
hot booty of another group. It was one mob sending a message to 
another.
(Fritz 2003)8
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 As in the case of the ascribed trust groups, the activities of these networks 
have been affected by the insurgency. Process- based networks’ activities have 
often directly contributed to prolonging the insurgency in five ways. First, 
they have contributed to the destruction or circumvention of the formal 
economy and the growth of informal and black markets, thereby effectively 
blurring the lines between the formal, informal and criminal sectors. Second, 
such networks have engaged in pillage, predation and extortion; they have 
used deliberate violence against civilians to extort ransoms and capture trade 
networks and diaspora remittances. Third, these networks have led to greater 
decentralisation, both in the means of coercion and in the means of produc-
tion and exchange, again blurring the lines between formal and informal 
activities. Fourth, such networks have contributed to the licit or illicit exploi-
tation of lucrative natural resources. Finally, process- based trust networks 
often rely on cross- border trading networks, regional kin and ethnic groups, 
arms traffickers and mercenaries, as well as legally operating commercial 
entities, each of which may have a vested interest in the continuation of con-
flict and instability. Many of the cross- border relationships cultivated by the 
various smuggler/criminal groups in the 1990s are still in place and opera-
tional at the present time. Jonathan Goodhand observes that in many con-
flicts the shadow economy was already widespread before the outbreak of 
conflict and is a facilitating factor for conflict, as it often contributes to 
violent state collapse, or serves as a source of income to would- be-rebels. 
Once conflict erupts, shadow economies are easily captured by combatants 
and thus often become the basis for the combat economy (2004). This has 
happened in Iraq, with kidnappings and smuggling providing significant 
financial assistance to the insurgency (Salih 2004).
 Western intelligence agencies are becoming increasingly worried about 
this systematic strengthening of ties between terrorists and organised 
crime. Stefan Maier of the German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs confirmed that cooperation between the two camps was on the rise, 
despite their different political and economic motives (Deutsche Welle 
2004). As he observes: 
Common ground between terrorists and organized criminal groups can 
be found primarily in two areas. First, the two come together in money- 
laundering activities: Terrorists often need to park their money tempo-
rarily with somebody else to cover up their tracks. Secondly, they need 
weapons, and they usually get them straight from organized crime
(Struck 2005: A18)
 ‘With the lack of security measures, disorganized crime became organ-
ized crime’, said Hania Mufti, Baghdad director of Human Rights Watch, 
‘then, at some point, there was a merging between organized crime and 
political crime’ (Struck 2005: A18). In today’s Iraq, terrorist groups use 
many of the same channels for their activities that the Iraqi government 
067 10 Corruption 10.indd   175 3/6/11   13:44:06














































and associated criminal groups used in the 1980s and 1990s. In this regard, 
Iraq is an ideal environment for this type of activity. Decades of socialist 
and statist experiments of the Ba’ath Party regime, together with sub-
sequent wars and the consequences of UN sanctions have left the Iraqi 
economy heavily damaged, distorted and exposed to administrative and 
political interference (Looney 2004). Within this context, terrorists, insur-
gents and organised crime elements have been able to thrive by exploiting 
various economic and institutional weaknesses.
Extended trust networks
While extended trust networks may involve some reliance on kinship and 
family relationships, they are largely characterised by transactions between 
anonymous individuals. As noted, they are a key element in a modern eco-
nomic system. Since the focus of the present analysis is on the informal 
economy, these networks will not be treated in detail other than to note 
that they are largely undeveloped outside the public sector and the 
national oil industry. Some banking arrangements are moving in this 
direction, albeit extremely slowly (Looney 2005c).
 Clearly, for Iraq, the key challenge facing the economy is developing 
the conditions conducive to the creation and growth of extended trust 
networks. Conversely, the lack of supporting institutions has constrained 
most economic agents to informal activities characterised by family- and 
kinship- based ascribed trust.
 Because the informal economy is largely the result of a convergence of 
powerful long- run demographic and economic forces, it will be a fixture 
for some time to come. At best, informal activities may evolve over the 
next several years with some progression from ascribed trust- based net-
works to process trust- based networks. If this transition is viewed as success-
ful by Iraqi entrepreneurs and the government makes significant strides in 
the governance area, then the progression to extended trust- based net-
works becomes a distinct possibility, particularly if the security situation 
stabilises enough to support foreign direct investment.
 However, a good case can be made that under current conditions, the 
development and evolution of organised networks may perpetuate and 
even expand the shadow economy through corruption and intimidation. 
Many of the organised networks today have evolved out of Ba’ath party 
efforts to limit traditional centres of tribal authority. In effect the Ba’ath 
party encouraged the growth and proliferation of informal associational 
links locally, as described below.
The evolution of local networks9
Local- level kinship affiliation was increasingly encouraged as the effects of 
the 1980s war with Iran and the sanctions of the 1990s drained the power 














































Reconstruction and corruption in Iraq  177
of the central government. Particularly after the 1991 Gulf War, the 
central government was weakened to the point that it was unable to 
perform many of its traditional military, economic and security 
functions.10
 The Ba’athist survival strategy during this period was for the party to 
serve as an umbrella for local tribal associations that would assist in provid-
ing state capacity. By 1996, officially sanctioned ‘tribes’ were responsible 
not only for the maintenance of local law and order, but also collected 
taxes on behalf of the government, were appointed judicial powers, and 
applied customary tribal law within their territory. They received arms and 
ammunition, vehicles and logistical support as payment for services ren-
dered to the party.
 Local dominance of revived tribal networks was evident in 1998, follow-
ing the eviction of the UN weapons inspectors, which resulted in US/UK 
air strikes against Iraq. At that time, heavily armed and equipped Sunni 
tribal units were positioned in and around Baghdad to control the restive 
urban population, a role formerly belonging to the Ba’ath Party militia. 
With time, the interests of the central government and local networks 
began to diverge. Clan- based groups controlled the highways around 
Baghdad. They increasingly turned to criminal activities, such as looting, 
smuggling and hijacking throughout most of al Anbar province. Con-
ditions deteriorated to the extent that convoys were necessary even for 
basic travel in daylight to avoid raids by tribal guerrillas.
 By 2000, policemen, judges and party officials were subject to violent 
tribal recriminations. Encounters between Iraqi soldiers and tribal irregu-
lars, especially those based in al Anbar province escalated in frequency 
and scale. In this ever more lawless environment, tribal elements began to 
take over many of the local, informal street markets. These markets com-
prised a sub- stratum of the informal Iraqi economy that, as discussed 
earlier, began to grow from the early 1980s as a result of chronic resource 
scarcities brought on by war, and were aggravated by unrest and a decade 
of sanctions. In addition, Saddam Hussein’s selective distribution of scarce 
resources created some of the underlying group rivalries that exist today. 
By directing funds, rations, government positions, electricity, clean water, 
fuel and industrial investment toward specific villages in the western Sunni 
regions in exchange for service to the regime, and withholding resources 
to other villages as a punitive mechanism, a local- level competitive calculus 
developed that was perpetuated by Hussein as an instrument for rule. 
Because the state- level formal economy was dramatically curtailed by sanc-
tions, this competition for resources further encouraged the growth of 
informal activities and employment.
 The tendency of corrupt party and state institutions to favour key sup-
porters in the distribution of goods and services encouraged those operat-
ing in the informal (and formal) economy to rely on local level mediation 
by tribal groups. Because informal activity is based in large part on social 
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capital – the trusted familial and kinship ties noted above – local tribal 
groups played a central role in the expansion of the informal economy. By 
assessing fees for the settlement of disputes and collecting taxes on local 
production, local tribal groups also began to establish financial support 
systems free of state control.
 Tribal groups were also increasingly involved in criminal- type activities, 
especially in the western border regions. Illicit criminal networks were ini-
tially based on the cross- border smuggling of animals, tea, alcohol and 
electronics. Later, these activities began to encompass the drug trade. 
Tribal- based organised criminal activities increased toward the end of 
Ba’athist rule with many party members becoming involved due to declin-
ing opportunities to acquire official resources. By early 2002, the entire 
route along the Euphrates River in al Anbar had essentially developed into 
a sanctuary for illicit traffickers and criminal entrepreneurs.
 Resource scarcity and the stature of sub- tribal groups were both greatly 
enhanced at the local level following the removal of Saddam Hussein. The 
process began with the Coalition Provisional Authority’s early adoption of 
a neo- liberal economic programme which had the unintended effect of 
impeding the growth of regulatory and legal institutions. This institutional 
vacuum forced businesses and those entering the labour market to rely on 
the trusted kinship or extended family networks of the informal economy. 
Shortages of critical inputs such as electricity and fuel, and the dangers of 
transportation further encouraged informal entrepreneurs to rely on 
tribal and extended family associations for protection and support.
 Endemic corruption and uncertainty further contributed to a dramatic 
increase in the informal sector following the 2003 invasion. As a result, 
approximately 80 per cent of the labour force is now engaged informally, 
accounting for nearly two- thirds of Iraq’s gross domestic product. In this 
regard, growth of the informal economy is particularly evident in certain 
areas west of the capital, where the destruction of the Sunni- oriented mili-
tary establishment and related industries has contributed to a substantial 
contraction of formal employment.
 Reinforcing these trends has been a dramatic rise in criminal activity 
dominated by local- level tribal elements, including emerging economic 
sectors based on the distribution of scarce resources, kidnapping, traffick-
ing in petrol, narcotics, looted weaponry and the targeting of coalition 
forces. Where the Iraqi government lacks control or where there is not a 
substantial coalition presence, the shadow economy is rapidly displacing 
any legal or semi- legal structures that have managed to survive.
Conclusion: a possible way out of the vicious circle
The integrated model sketched above suggests that any attempts to reduce 
corruption in Iraq needs to place the problem in a broader historical, 
social and economic context. Rather than focusing on trust- building and 
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institutional reform, the current reconstruction strategy has emphasised 
market reforms, infrastructure development and private foreign invest-
ment. It is not producing tangible economic gains and in fact has created 
an environment in which corruption flourishes.
 As a result, the massive expenditures in infrastructure have not pro-
duced the significant follow- on investment that Hirschman’s unbalanced 
growth strategy might have anticipated (1958). Instead, infrastructure 
projects have been an easy target for the insurgents and a financial drain 
for the United States and the Iraqi government. The top- down nature of 
the post- war strategy is another reason for its limited impact. Rather than 
focusing on grassroots community development and trust building, there 
has only been limited Iraqi input and participation. Consequently many of 
the investments undertaken are not nearly as productive in the Iraqi 
context as they would have been if they were indigenously designed to 
respond to a tangible domestic demand enhanced by growing domestic 
markets. On the other hand, bureaucratic fear of the anti- corruption 
measures that are in effect has brought needed capital programmes to a 
halt.
 The critical question is what can be done to break out of the current 
vicious circle of corruption, government inefficiency and pervasive unem-
ployment trapping the Iraqi economy in a low growth path? Thomas Palley 
for instance has argued that the country’s current needs are so pressing 
that a significant share of oil revenues should be disbursed to the popula-
tion immediately (2003). His tentative figure was that 25 per cent of reve-
nues be distributed.
 The logical argument against disbursing a large share of oil revenues 
directly to the public is whether the country can afford such a 
programme.
 A counter argument is that these projects have been a major source of 
corruption. Taking the money out of the hands of a corrupt political elite 
and giving it to the population is probably the most powerful anti- 
corruption policy available today (Gillies 2010b) – the policy of simply 
going after the ‘bad guys’ has clearly failed. In contrast, a distribution 
scheme would help undermine two key elements contributing to the coun-
try’s massive corruption problem – the shadow economy and deficient 
social capital. With regard to the latter, currently one of the main stum-
bling blocks in uniting Iraq is the ongoing controversy over the distribu-
tion of oil revenues with each region not trusting the others to agree to a 
‘fair’ allocation. The direct distribution of oil revenues would assist in 
overcoming this impediment while eliminating one of the major impedi-
ments to improved trust. The process is summarised in Figure 10.1.
 Such a policy would provide an incentive to ordinary Iraqis to protect 
the country’s oil facilities by providing intelligence on insurgent groups 
attempting to disrupt the production and flow of oil ( Johnson 2004). It 
might further help to quell the insurgency by allaying the fears of the 
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Sunnis that they will suffer financially from the fact that most oil reserves 
are in Shiite and Kurdish territories. Without an equitable distribution of 
oil revenues, the competition among various groups for oil money could 
turn ugly and even erupt into violent conflict in Iraq. Rifts over oil reve-
nues already run deep, as Iraqi Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen struggle for 
control of oil- rich Kirkuk (Revenue Watch 2005).
 Distributing oil revenues directly to the public could also contribute to 
the formalisation of a range of economic activities by creating an irrevoca-
ble personal identity under the law, and thus establishing the conditions 
for, inter alia, property rights and the registration for taxation; and could 
expand banking and credit access for small businesses. While not a 
panacea, the impact of such a policy is likely to contribute to reducing the 
impact of corruption and stabilising the economic environment in post- 



































Figure 10.1 Iraq virtuous circle of demand-led private sector activity.














































Reconstruction and corruption in Iraq  181
shown no interest in such a programme – the country’s new oil law that 
will government most aspects of the oil industry and is progressive in many 
key aspects surrounding the treatment of oil royalties, is completely silent 
on this issue (Lidstone 2009).
Notes
 1 Quoted by Negus (2006).
 2 See Philp, this volume for the conceptual difficulties in defining corruption in 
post- conflict settings. See also Jain (2001).
 3 As the storming of a police station in Basra by British forces in December 2006 
showed, parts of Basra’s police have been at the centre of the city’s criminal 
activity.
 4 This source is the basis of the summary of SIGIR findings reported in the para-
graphs that follow.
 5 In an analysis of the size of informal economies across 146 countries corrup-
tion was found to be statistically significant at the 95 per cent level.
 6 An overview of the literature on social capital can be found in Paldam (2000). 
The concept of social capital owes its origins to Robert Putnam (1993, 2000).
 7 See Braude (2003: ch. 4) for a detailed account of this process.
 8 For a full assessment of early post- Saddam crime in Iraq see UNODC (2003).
 9 This section draws heavily on Haussler (2005: 33–41).
10 For this period see Braude (2003) and Glain (2004: ch. 5).
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